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Abstract 
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1. Introduction 
 
The purpose of this paper is to analyze strategic product (i.e., quality-improving) R&D 
investment policy in a standard framework of a third-country market. In particular, we use a 
horizontal product differentiation model that includes endogenous quality choice. 
Furthermore, assuming the presence of demand spillover effects associated with improving 
the quality of a product, we consider how demand spillovers affect optimality of R&D 
investment policy in the cases of a noncooperative and a cooperative policy decision. Thus, 
we show that the optimality depends on the strength of demand spillover effects. 
Seminal papers that deal with Cournot duopoly in a homogeneous product market and 
consider strategic process (i.e., cost-reducing) R&D investment competition include Brander 
and Spencer (1983), Spencer and Brander (1983), and others. These authors analyze how 
R&D investments affect the environment for market competition. In addition, they show that 
an R&D investment subsidy is an optimal policy in the case of international rivalry. 
With regard to the literature that analyzes product R&D investment competition, i.e., 
endogenous quality choice, based on a model of vertical product differentiation, some 
researchers have analyzed strategic product R&D investment policy with international rivalry, 
for example, Park (2001), Zhou et al. (2002), and Jinji (2003). These researchers implicitly 
assume the case of partial market coverage, in which there are some consumers who do not 
purchase any products. However, in the case of full market coverage, in which all consumers 
purchase either any product, a firm producing a low-quality product chooses the lower limit 
quality level, i.e., a corner solution. Thus, the government’s R&D investment policy does not 
affect the low-quality firm’s activity. However, assuming a Hotelling model with quality 
choice (e.g., Sanjo, 2007; Ishibashi and Kaneko, 2008) and a model of a horizontally and 
vertically differentiated products market (e.g., André, et al., 2009), we examine the case of 
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complete market coverage. 
As mentioned above, introducing demand spillover effects into a model of horizontally 
differentiated products with quality choice (e.g., Häckner, 2000; Symeonidis, 2003), we 
address strategic product R&D investment policy. Formally, our model is similar to 
d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and De Bondt and Henriques (1995), in which they treat 
the spillover effect of cost-reducing R&D investment on the marginal cost of production, i.e., 
the technology-side spillover effect1. Closely related to our model dealing with the spillover 
effect on the demand side associated with improving the quality of horizontally differentiated 
products, we have Foros et al. (2002) and Stühmeier (2012), in which they discuss the role of 
roaming endogenously determined by competitive firms in a mobile phone industry. Roaming 
in their models corresponds to the parameter indicating demand spillover effects in our model. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, as preliminary, we 
present the optimal conditions with respect to a noncooperative and a cooperative R&D 
investment policy. In Section 3, we consider strategic product R&D investment policy in the 
presence of demand spillover effects and then examine the optimal policy. Furthermore, in 
Section 4, assuming heterogeneous consumers and alternative utility functions associated with 
a horizontal product differentiation model with quality choice, we address the same problems 
as in the previous section. Section 5 summarizes our results and raises remaining issues. 
 
 
2. Preliminary: The conditions of an optimal R&D investment policy 
 
2.1 R&D investment competition with international rivalry 
                                                 
1 Symeonidis (2003) deals with the spillover effect of quality-improving R&D investment on 
the investment costs. 
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To consider a strategic product R&D investment policy, we employ a standard framework of 
the third-country market. That is, there are two countries, home and foreign, in which one 
firm exists respectively. The firm located in each country sells the product to the third-country 
market, but it does not sell it to the markets in the home and foreign countries. Hereafter, the 
firm located in the home (foreign) country is denoted as firm 1 (2). 
The firms compete in a two-stage game. In stage 1, each firm simultaneously chooses its 
investment level, which affects the market competition in the subsequent stage. The 
investment can be interpreted as R&D. In stage 2, each firm simultaneously chooses its 
market action, i.e., either price or output. As analyzed below, the home and foreign 
governments either noncooperatively or cooperatively commit to an R&D investment policy 
in stage 0, prior to the game played by the firms. Throughout, we restrict our attention to 
pure-strategy equilibria and focus on the interior solutions. We confine our attention to 
subgame-perfect equilibria in two stages by solving the model backward.  
The Nash equilibrium outcome for firm i in stage 2 (i.e., product market competition) is 
expressed by the equilibrium revenue, [ ] ,,2,1,,, jijizzR jii ≠=  where iz  is firm i’s 
activity (e.g., investment and quality levels) and jz  is the rival firm’s activity. Furthermore, 
the investment cost function of firm i is given by ],[ ii zF  where ,0]0[]0[ =
′
= ii FF  
,0][ >′ ii zF  ,0][ >
″
ii zF  for ,0>iz  ,][lim ∞=
′
∞→ iiz zFi  and .0][
''' ≥ii zF  Thus, 
the profit function of firm i in stage 1 is expressed as 
[ ] [ ] ,,2,1,],[)1(,, jijizFszzRzz iiijiijii ≠=−−=Π   
where )1(<is  is an investment subsidy from the government of country i. In addition, 
negative is  implies an investment tax.  
The first-order condition (FOC) to maximize the profit of firm i is given by 
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It is clear in eq. (2) and eq. (3) that a subsidy of government i always increases firm i’s 
activity, whereas the effect on firm j’s activity depends on the sign of the cross effect of its 
profit function. 
 
2.2 The optimal R&D investment policy in the noncooperative case 
We consider the unilaterally set R&D investment policy at stage 0, i.e., noncooperatively, 
government i chooses an investment subsidy/tax on its domestic firm, ,is  to maximize 
domestic social welfare, ,iW  which is given by 
[ ] [ ] [ ] ],[,][, iijiiiiijiiii zFzzRzFszzsW −=−Π=  
where [ ] .,2,1,,, jijisszz jiii ≠==   
Based on the FOC to maximize the social welfare of country i, i.e., ,0=
∂
∂
i
i
s
W
 given 
,jz  we derive the optimal R&D investment policy in the noncooperative case as 
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Based on eq. (2) and eq. (3), eq. (4) can be rewritten as  
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In this case, we obtain 
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Because it holds that ,
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Therefore, as already shown in Spencer and Brander (1983), Park (2001), Toshimitsu and 
Jinji (2008), and others, in view of eq. (6), we summarize as follows. 
 
Lemma 1 
A noncooperative optimal R&D investment policy by the home government depends on 
(i) the sign of the externality of the foreign firm’s R&D activities toward the home firm, 
i.e., ,
j
i
z
R
∂
∂
 ,,2,1, jiji ≠=  and  
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(ii) the sign of the slope of the foreign firm’s R&D investment reaction curves, i.e., ,
i
j
dz
dz
 
in other words, the sign of the cross effect of the foreign firm’s profit function, i.e., 
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where firm i (j) is the home (foreign) firm.  
 
Lemma 1 (ii) implies that the strategic relationship between firms is either substitute or 
complement, i.e., 0<
i
j
dz
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 or ,0>
i
j
dz
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 .,2,1, jiji ≠=  
 
2.3 The optimal R&D investment policy in the cooperative case 
In the case of a cooperative R&D investment policy by both governments, we assume that 
each government decides an R&D investment policy to maximize joint social welfare of both 
countries, given by  
[ ] [ ] [ ] [ ] [ ].,,,,, 21221121221121 ssssssWssWssW Π+Π=+≡  
That is, as shown in the equation above, the joint welfare is the same as the joint profits of 
both firms in the framework of the third-country market. 
Thus, the FOC to maximize the joint social welfare with respect to the cooperative R&D 
investment policy of the home government is represented as 
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Similarly, for the cooperative R&D investment policy of the foreign government, we have 
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Taking eq. (2), eq. (3), eq. (7), and eq. (8) into account, an optimal cooperative R&D 
investment policy is given by 
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where superscript C denotes the cooperative case. Therefore, we sum up the result as follows. 
 
Lemma 2 
An optimal cooperative R&D investment policy by the home government depends on the sign 
of the externality of the home firm’s R&D activities toward the foreign firm, i.e., ,
i
j
z
R
∂
∂
 
,,2,1, jiji ≠=  where firm i (j) is the home (foreign) firm. 
 
 
3. Optimal R&D investment policy and quality competition2  
 
3.1 Horizontal product differentiation model with quality choice and demand spillover effects 
Here we employ the same setting as in Section 2: that is, there are two countries, home and 
foreign, in which one firm exists, respectively. The firms compete in a two-stage game. In 
stage 1, a firm simultaneously chooses the quality level, hereafter, ,ii qz =  .2,1=i  In 
stage 2, a firm simultaneously chooses the price, ,ip  .2,1=i  
We assume that the utility of a representative consumer in the third-market is given by a 
                                                 
2 This section is based on Toshimitsu (2012). 
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quality-augmented version of a standard quasilinear function, which is attached with the term 
of demand spillover effects by improving quality as  
,yUV +=  
( ) ( ) { },)()(
2
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2112122121
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2
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


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where y  is the numeral good, and .1=yp  In addition, 0>α  and .01 ≥>θ  θ  is a 
parameter indicating substitutability between the products. In particular, for the second term 
composed of quality arguments in eq. (10), we assume that ,iε  2,1=i ),01( ≥> iε  
implies demand spillover effects of an increase in the quality level of product i3. 
The budget constraint is given by ,02211 xxpxpI ++≥  so that we obtain the optimal 
behavior of a representative consumer as 
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Thus, the demand function of product i is given by 
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Given eq. (11), we have 
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As shown in eq. (12), if the strength of demand spillover effects of product j’s quality is 
larger (smaller) than substitutability, an increase in the quality level increases (decreases) the 
demand of the rival firm i. 
 
                                                 
3 If ,0=iε  the utility function is formally similar to that of Häckner (2000). See also the 
appendix in Symeonidis (2003). 
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3.2 The analysis  
In Stage 2, firm i decides the price to maximize the profit, i.e., ].[)1( iiiiii qFsxp −−=Π  
The FOC to maximize the profit of firm i is expressed by ,0=Λ−=
∂
Π∂
ii
i
i px
p
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 Thus, taking eq. (11) into account, we have 
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Therefore, the price of product i in the Nash equilibrium is given by 
,
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=
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i
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where ,0)2)(1( >+−≡Α θθα ,02 2 >−−≡Φ θθεii  and .)2( 2 θεθ −−≡Γ jj  
Hereafter, we omit the indexes of the firms in each equation, i.e., ,,2,1, jiji ≠=  unless we 
refer to them specifically.  
In this case, it holds that  
[ ] ,)(0)( θε <≥Θ⇔<≥Γ jj                                       (15) 
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2
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jj
j
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Eq. (15) shows that if the parameter composed of demand spillovers with product j’s 
quality, i.e., [ ],jεΘ  is larger (smaller) than a certain value of the substitutability, ,θ  then 
quality improvement of product j raises the price of product i as well as product j. That is, 
firm i raises (reduces) the price, because the positive effect by demand spillovers is larger 
(smaller) than the negative effect by substitutability between the products. 
In Stage 1, firm i decides the quality level that maximizes the profit, which is given by 
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Furthermore, with respect to the cross effect, we obtain 
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Eq. (17) implies that the slope of reaction functions, in other words, the strategic 
relationships between the firms, depends on the strength of a demand spillover effect of the 
rival firm. Furthermore, the external effect on the profit (revenue) is given by 
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Thus, we obtain 
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Eq. (19) illustrates the external effect on the firm’s revenue. The sign depends on the 
strength of demand spillover effects of the rival firm only, irrespective of the mode of market 
competition. 
For the following analysis, we assume as follows. 
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Assumption 1: Asymmetric demand spillover effects 
If the demand spillover effect of product 1 is larger than that of product 2, i.e., ,21 εε >  
then it holds that [ ] [ ].2211 εε Θ=Θ>Θ=Θ  
 
Taking into account eq. (15), eq. (17), eq. (19), and Assumption 1, I derive the following 
lemma. 
 
Lemma 3 
(1) If ,21 θ>Θ>Θ  each firm’s reaction curve is sloping upward. Hence, an increase 
in the quality of product 2 (1) increases the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
(2) If ,21 Θ>Θ>θ  each firm’s reaction curve is sloping downward. Hence, an 
increase in the quality of product 2 (1) decreases the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
(3) If ,21 Θ>>Θ θ  firm 1’s reaction curve is sloping downward, whereas firm 2’s is 
sloping upward. Hence, an increase in the quality of product 2 (1) decreases 
(increases) the revenue of firm 1 (2). 
 
For Lemma 3 (1) (Lemma 3 (2)), if the strength of demand spillovers of both firms’ 
products is larger (smaller) than a certain value of substitutability, an increase in the quality 
level of one firm expands (reduces) the rival firm’s demand, and this, in turn, increases 
(decreases) the rival firm’s price and quality. Thus, the rival firm’s profit increases (decreases). 
Similarly, the firm’s profit increases (decreases) with an increase in the rival firm’s quality. 
Therefore, the strategic complementary (substitutionary) relationship between the firms holds. 
See Figure 1 (Figure 2).  
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Place Figures 1 and 2 approximately here 
 
Furthermore, for Lemma 3 (3), when the strength of demand spillovers is asymmetric 
between the firms, i.e., the strength of a demand spillover effect of product 1 is larger and that 
of product 2 is smaller than a certain value of substitutability, an increase in product 1 
expands firm 2’s demand, while an increase in product 2 reduces firm 1’s demand. In this case, 
firm 2 increases its price and quality, while firm 1 decreases its price and quality. As a result, 
firm 2’s profit increases, while firm 1’s falls. Thus, the strategic substitutionary relationship 
sustains for firm 1, while the strategic complementary relationship sustains for firm 2. See 
Figure 3. 
 
Place Figure 3 approximately here 
 
3.3 The optimal R&D investment policy in the noncooperative case 
An optimal R&D investment policy in the noncooperative case is one in which the 
government makes the domestic firm a leader in a Stackelberg game. This aspect has already 
been addressed in the context of strategic trade and industrial policies. Therefore, based on 
Lemmas 1 and 3, we easily derive the following results. 
 
Proposition 1 
(1) If either θ>Θ>Θ 21  or ,21 Θ>Θ>θ  then a noncooperative R&D investment 
subsidy is optimal, i.e., ,0* >is  .2,1=i  
(2) If ,21 Θ>>Θ θ  then a noncooperative R&D investment tax is optimal, i.e., ,0* <is  
 14
.2,1=i  
 
First, as to Proposition 1 (1), if the strength of demand spillovers of both firms is either 
larger or smaller than a certain value of substitutability of the products, each government 
gives its domestic firm a subsidy to upgrade its quality level. Incidentally, in the case of a 
large enough demand spillover effect, subsidizing the domestic firm increases the foreign 
firm’s quality level as well as that of the domestic firm. This, in turn, leads to an increase in 
the profits of both firms and thus the welfare of both countries (see point 1S  in Figure 1). 
However, in the case of a smaller demand spillover effect, subsidizing the domestic firm 
reduces the foreign firm’s quality level, but increases that of the domestic firm. This, in turn, 
leads to a decrease in the foreign firm’s profit, and an increase in that of the domestic firm 
(see point 1S  in Figure 2). This case is similar to that of Spencer and Brander (1983), in 
which they consider the cost-reducing (i.e., process) R&D investment policy in a Cournot 
competition.  
In the case of a large demand spillover effect, because the market size increases through 
quality improvement of the products, both governments will subsidize the domestic firm. On 
the other hand, in the case of a small demand spillover effect, because market size does not 
increase through quality improvement of the products, but the firm’s share reduces by an 
increase in the quality level of the rival firm’s product, both governments will subsidize the 
domestic firm to expand its market share. 
Second, as to Proposition 1 (2), in the case of asymmetric demand spillovers, each 
government taxes the domestic firm to reduce its quality level. That is, a decrease in the 
quality level of firm 1 (2) reduces (increases) the quality level of firm 2 (1). In this case, the 
profit of firm 1 (2) increases by the negative (positive) externality effect on the revenue of 
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firm 1 (2). However, a country’s R&D investment tax policy, in which the firm produces the 
product associated with a larger (smaller) demand spillover effect, reduces (increases) the 
profit of the other firm, and thus the welfare of the other country. See point 1S  )( 2S  in 
Figure 3.  
Taxing firm 1 producing a large demand spillover product reduces the quality level of the 
rival firm 2 as well as its quality. This mitigates the degree of a fall of the price of firm 1 and 
expands its share. Accordingly, R&D tax policy increases the profit of firm 1 and thus the 
welfare of the government, although it reduces the profit of the rival firm 2.  
On the contrary, taxing firm 2 producing a small demand spillover product reduces its 
quality level, but increases the quality level of the rival firm 1. For firm 2, this mitigates the 
degree of a fall of the price of firm 2 and expands its demand. In addition, the profit of firm 1 
increases. Accordingly, the R&D tax policy increases the profits of both firms and thus the 
welfare of both countries. This implies that the R&D tax on the firm producing a small 
demand spillover product is Pareto improving. 
 
3.4 The optimal R&D investment policy in the cooperative case 
An optimal cooperative R&D investment policy of the governments is determined by joint 
welfare maximization. This implies that both firms collusively determine their quality levels 
to maximize their joint profits; however, they noncooperatively compete in prices in the 
product market4. Therefore, both firms choose the quality level existing in Pareto superior sets, 
which are the shaded areas surrounded by the iso-profit curves of both firms, i.e., 
.2,1, =Π iNi  For example, in the case of large demand spillover effects, i.e., 
                                                 
4  This situation illustrates semicollusion similar to the cooperative R&D investment 
considered by d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and others. 
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,21 θ>Θ>Θ  both firms choose higher quality levels than the levels in the Nash 
equilibrium. In other words, each government subsidizes its domestic firm (see Figure 1). 
With respect to the other cases of demand spillover effects, we can similarly explain the 
optimal cooperative R&D investment policy. 
Therefore, based on Lemmas 2 and 3, we easily derive the following proposition. 
 
Proposition 2 
(1) If θ>Θ>Θ 21  ( ),21 Θ>Θ>θ   then an optimal cooperative R&D investment 
policy is a subsidy (tax), i.e., 0>Cis  ( ).0<Cis  .2,1=i  
(2) If ,21 Θ>>Θ θ  then a cooperative R&D investment subsidy on firm 1 and tax on firm 
2 are optimal, i.e., 01 >
Cs  and .02 <
Cs  
Note that superscript C denotes the cooperative case. 
We have an interesting case, in which there are asymmetric demand spillovers, presented 
by Proposition 2 (2). In the model of vertical product differentiation, Proposition 3 in Zhou, et 
al. (2002) is that jointly optimal policies involve an investment subsidy in the developed 
country and an investment tax in the less-developed country. In their model, the firm 
producing the high- (low-) quality product locates in the developed (less-developed) country. 
That is, the jointly optimal policies expand the difference in quality levels and thus mitigate 
price competition. This, in turn, increases the joint profits of the firms and thus the joint 
welfare of their countries.  
For our model, if we can assume that a firm producing the product associated with large 
(small) demand spillovers locates in the developed (less-developed) country, by the same 
reasons derived in the results of Zhou, et al. (2002), we state that cooperative R&D policy is a 
mix of an investment subsidy in the developed country and an investment tax in the 
 17
less-developed country.  
 
 
4. Discussion: Alternative utility functions and heterogeneous consumers 
 
4.1 A Hotelling model with quality choice  
In the previous section, we assumed a homogeneous consumer with a standard quasilinear 
utility function involved with quality arguments. Here, we first assume heterogeneous 
consumers and use a standard Hotelling spatial model of duopoly associated with quality 
choice (e.g., Sanjo, 2007; Ishibashi and Kaneko, 2008). There is a continuum of consumers 
uniformly distributed on the [ ]1,0  interval. The density of consumers is assumed to be one. 
Firm i (i = 0,1) supplies product at a product quality iq  with price .ip  Each consumer 
purchases at most one unit of a product. A consumer located at [ ]1,0∈x  has net utility 
txpqvU −−+= 000  when he or she purchases product 0. Similarly, when purchasing 
product 1, the net utility is .)1(111 txpqvU −−−+=  Here, )0(>v  is v  is the utility 
obtained from consuming a single unit of the product, irrespective of the quality level. In 
addition, the parameter )0(>t  implies the transportation cost.  
Comparing net utilities, i.e., ,iU  the demand function of product i is given by  
( ),
2
1
2
1
jijii ppqqt
x +−−+=  .,1,0, jiji ≠=                     (20) 
To simplify, we assume no production costs. Thus, we derive the equilibrium price in 
Stage 2 as 
,
3
ji
i
qq
tp
−
+=  .,1,0, jiji ≠=                                   (21) 
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Therefore, the revenue function of firm i’s in Stage 1 is given by 
[ ] ,
62
1
3
, 


 −
+


 −
+=
t
qqqq
tqqR jijijii  .,1,0, jiji ≠=             (22) 
   Based on (22), we obtain the externality of firm j toward the revenue of firm i, and the 
factor deciding the strategic relationship between firms (i.e., the slope of the reaction 
function).  
That is, with regard to these factors, we have 
,0
36
1
62
1
3
1
<


 −
+−


 −
+−=
∂
∂ jiji
j
i qqt
t
qq
q
R
                     (23) 
,0
9
12
<−=
∂∂
∂
tqq
R
ji
i                                               (24) 
where .,1,0, jiji ≠=   
   In view of (23) and (24), and taking Lemmas 1 and 2 into account, we derive the 
following results. 
 
Corollary 1 
(1) An optimal noncooperative R&D investment policy is a subsidy, i.e., ,0* >is  .1,0=i  
(2) An optimal cooperative R&D investment policy is a tax, i.e., ,0<Cis  .1,0=i  
 
   These results are similar to those of Spencer and Brander (1983, Proposition 2) and the 
case of a small demand spillover effect, as in Propositions 1 (1) and 2 (1) of our model. 
Although we do not assume demand spillover effects, even with the presence of demand 
spillover effects, the results do not change (see Appendix A). 
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4.2 A horizontal and vertical product differentiation model 
We exploit the utility function composed of horizontally and vertically differentiated products 
presented by André, et al. (2009, Section 6). That is, there is a continuum of consumers 
uniformly distributed on the [ ]1,0  interval. The density of consumers is assumed to be one. 
Firm i (i = 0,1) supplies product at quality iq  with price .ip  Each consumer purchases at 
most one unit of a product. A consumer located at [ ]1,0∈x  has net utility 
000 )1( pqxU −−=  when he or she purchases product 0. Similarly, when purchasing 
product 1, the net utility is given by .111 pxqU −=  
   Therefore, we derive the demand function of firm i 
,
ji
jii
i qq
ppq
x
+
+−
=  ,1 ij xx −=  .,1,0, jiji ≠=                     (25) 
To simplify, we assume no production costs. In this case, we derive the equilibrium price 
in Stage 2 as follows. 
,
3
2 ji
i
qq
p
+
=  .,1,0, jiji ≠=                                    (26) 
Thus, based on eq. (25) and eq. (26), firm i’s revenue function of qualities in Stage 1 is 
given by 
[ ] ,
)(3
2
3
2
, 



+
+



 +
=
ji
jiji
jii qq
qqqq
qqR  .,1,0, jiji ≠=                (27) 
   Based on eq. (27), we obtain the externality of firm j toward the revenue of firm i, and the 
factor deciding the strategic relationship between firms. That is, with regard to these factors, 
we have as 
,0
)(9
)2(
2 >+
+
=
∂
∂
ji
jji
j
i
qq
qqq
q
R
                                         (28) 
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,0
)(9
2
3
2
<
+
−=
∂∂
∂
ji
ji
ji
i
qq
qq
qq
R
                                      (29) 
where .,1,0, jiji ≠=   
   In view of eq. (28) and eq. (29), and taking Lemmas 1 and 2 into account, we derive the 
following results. 
 
Corollary 2 
(1) An optimal noncooperative R&D investment policy is a tax, i.e., ,0* <is  .1,0=i  
(2) An optimal cooperative R&D investment policy is a subsidy, i.e., ,0>Cis  .1,0=i  
 
These results are the reverse of Corollary 1 derived in the Hotelling model with the 
quality choice model analyzed in Section 4.1. This is because the sign of the externality are 
different between eq. (23) and eq. (28), although the sign indicating the strategic relationship 
between the firms is the same (i.e., strategic substitutes). That is, in view of eq. (20) and eq. 
(25), an increase in the quality level of the rival firm’s product reduces the demand of the 
other firm, irrespective of the type of the utility functions. However, as in eq. (21), the 
increase reduces the price of the other firm, whereas, as in eq. (26), it conversely increases the 
price of the other firm. Hence, the sign of the externality is negative, as in eq. (23). On the 
other hand, because the effect of an increase in the price is larger than that of a decrease in the 
demand, the sign of the externality is positive, as in eq. (28). 
Although we do not allow for the demand spillover effects of the models in this section, 
even with the presence of demand spillover effects, the results do not change (see Appendix 
B). 
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5. Concluding remarks 
 
There is no doubt that international price and quality competition among firms prevails in 
many industries, such as those manufacturing electronic appliances, computers, HDTV, and 
others. There is international rivalry not only among firms in advanced countries, but also 
between firms in advanced countries and those in newly industrialized countries including 
China and India. Furthermore, governments support their domestic firms’ R&D investment 
activities in many ways, for example, with subsidies, tax credits, and other regulations, 
although they cannot publicly promote these firms’ export activities under the WTO system. 
Using a vertical product differentiation model, Zhou et al. (2002) and others have 
considered an optimal product R&D policy in the cases of noncooperation and cooperation. In 
a sense, they illustrate the differences in the competition and strategic policies of an advanced 
and a newly industrialized country. 
In contrast, in this paper, we have analyzed the same issues as in previous studies, based 
on a horizontal differentiated model with quality choice. Furthermore, we have assumed 
demand spillover effects in our model. That is, an increase in the quality level of the firm’s 
product may increase the other rival firm’s demand and profit. In other words, by focusing on 
both horizontal product differentiation (e.g., brand name and locations) and vertical product 
differentiation (i.e., quality), in the presence of similar demand spillover effects between the 
firms’ products, we show the example of strategic policy and competition between advanced 
countries such as the U.S., the EU, and Japan. In addition, in the presence of asymmetric 
demand spillover effects, we illustrate the example of strategic policy and competition 
between an advanced country (e.g., the U.S.) and a newly industrialized country (e.g., China). 
Under the above assumptions, we have found the following. In the cases of large and 
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small demand spillovers with respect to the firms’ products, i.e., the situation of similar 
demand spillover effects between firms in advanced countries, an R&D investment subsidy is 
an optimal policy. However, in the case of asymmetric demand spillover effects, an R&D 
investment tax is an optimal policy for the advanced country and the newly industrialized 
country. In particular, a government in a newly industrialized country rather reduces the 
domestic firm’s R&D activity to exploit large demand spillovers of the firm in the advanced 
country. 
Furthermore, we have considered optimality of cooperative R&D investment policy. In 
particular, in the case of asymmetric demand spillovers, we have shown the same results as in 
Zhou et al. (2002). That is, if a firm producing the product associated with large (small) 
demand spillovers locates in the advanced (newly industrialized) country, then an optimal 
cooperative R&D investment policy combines a subsidy by the advanced country with a tax 
by the newly industrialized country.  
We underline a specificity of our model. For example, we have exogenously introduced 
demand spillover effects associated with qualities into the quasilinear standard utility function. 
Thus, in future work, we need to research a general utility function that includes demand-side 
spillover effects. 
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Appendix A  
Let us introduce a demand spillover effect by quality upgrade into a Hotelling model with 
quality. In this case, a consumer located at [ ]1,0∈x  has net utility 
txpqqvU −−++= 01100 ε  when he or she purchases product 0. Similarly, when 
purchasing product 1, the net utility is .)1(10011 txpqqvU −−−++= ε  The 
parameters ),1(<iε  ,1,0=i  denote the marginal coefficient of a demand spillover effect. 
Thus, the demand function of product i is given by 
,
2
)1()1(
2
1
t
ppqq
x jijjiii
+−−−−
+=
εε
 .,1,0, jiji ≠=  
   We derive the equilibrium price in Stage 2 as 
,
3
)1()1( jjii
i
qq
tp
εε −−−
+=  .,1,0, jiji ≠=  
Therefore, the revenue function of firm i in Stage 1 is given by 
[ ] ,
6
)1()1(
2
1
3
)1()1(
, 


 −−−
+


 −−−
+=
t
qqqq
tqqR jjiijjiijii
εεεε
 
where .,1,0, jiji ≠=  
Because ,1,0,10 =<≤ iiε  we derive the same results of the externality on the firm’s 
revenue and cross effects as those in the case of nondemand spillover effects. 
 
Appendix B  
In the case of a horizontal and vertical product differentiation model, a consumer located at 
[ ]1,0∈x  has net utility 01100 ))(1( pqqxU −+−= ε  when he or she purchases product 
0. Similarly, when purchasing product 1, the net utility is .)( 10011 pqqxU −+= ε  The 
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parameter ),1(<iε  ,1,0=i  denotes the marginal coefficient of a demand spillover effect. 
   In this case, we derive the demand function of firm i as 
,
)1()1( jjii
jijji
i qq
ppqq
x
εε
ε
+++
+−+
=  .,1,0, jiji ≠=  
The equilibrium price in Stage 2 is given by 
,
3
)21()2( jjii
i
qq
p
εε +++
=  .,1,0, jiji ≠=  
Therefore, the revenue function of firm i in Stage 1 is given by 
[ ] { }{ } ,)1()1(9
)21()2(
,
2
jjii
jjii
jii qq
qq
qqR
εε
εε
+++
+++
=  .,1,0, jiji ≠=  
Although we omit the tedious calculations, we obtain the same results of the externality 
on the firm’s revenue and the cross effect as those in the case of nondemand spillover effects. 
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Figure 1  
θ>Θ>Θ 21  
N : Nash Equilibrium 
1S : Stackelberg Equilibrium, in which firm 1 is the leader 
k
iΠ ,2,1=i  FLk ,= : The profit of firm i being k ):,:( followerFleaderL  
Shaded area illustrates Pareto superior sets 
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Figure 2  
21 Θ>Θ>θ  
N : Nash Equilibrium 
1S : Stackelberg Equilibrium, in which firm 1 is the leader 
k
iΠ ,2,1=i  FLk ,= : The profit of firm i being k ):,:( followerFleaderL  
Shaded area illustrates Pareto superior sets 
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Figure 3  
21 Θ>>Θ θ  
N : Nash Equilibrium 
,iS ,2,1=i : Stackelberg Equilibrium, in which firm i is the leader 
,kiΠ ,2,1=i  FLk ,= : The profit of firm i being k ):,:( followerFleaderL  
Shaded area illustrates Pareto superior sets 
 
 
 
2q  
1q  
2q  
N
2Π
N
1Π  
N 
L
2ΠF
1Π  
2S  
1S  
L
1Π  
F
2Π
0 
Tq2  
1q  
Tq1  
